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This paper reports the results of a pilot study into ‘Turkish’ Migrants in London. Drawing on 
notions of ‘superdiversity’, ‘invisibility’ and ‘nodal points’ (where migrants’ actions intersect 
with policy), the account first maps out the three main constituent groups under study: Turkish 
Cypriots, ‘mainland’ Turks, and Kurds from Turkey. The main analytical part of the paper 
consists of an examination of the migration process of the three groups to London, built around 
the experiences of a small sample of migrants and key informants, and broken up into a 
number of stages – pre-migration and departure, arrival and adaptation, and settlement and 
the future. Throughout the analysis and in the conclusion, emphasis is laid on the intersection 
of migrants’ life-stages with the policy nodes, which are shown to have variable relevance for 
migrants’ decision-making. 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction: super-diversity and nodal 
points 
Steven Vertovec has recently opened a new 
strand in the debate on multicultural Britain 
and the politics of immigration and 
integration by invoking the notion of ‘super-
diversity’ to describe a level of complexity in 
migration processes and plurality of migrant 
groups never previously experienced in 
Britain. According to Vertovec (2007: 1024) 
‘diversity in Britain is not what is used to 
be’, especially in London where, in the 
words of Ken Livingstone, the city’s populist 
former mayor, ‘you see the world gathered 
in one city’ (quoted in Freeland 2005). The 
‘world in one city’ slogan also featured in 
the Greater London Authority’s analysis of 
the results of the 2001 Census (GLA 2005) 
and in the successful London bid to host 
the 2012 Olympic Games. 
What, exactly, has changed? Three things, 
according to Vertovec. First, Britain’s ethnic-
minority and immigrant-origin populations 
are no longer dominated, as once they 
were, by the large, well-organised and easily 
identifiable communities from the former 
colonial territories of the Caribbean and 
South Asia. The GLA report (2005) 
examined the presence of people from no 
fewer than 179 nations in the capital. So, 
more than ever before, more people from 
more places are coming to live in London. 
Second, there is a ‘diversification of 
diversity’, by which national origin is an 
imperfect measuring-rod of the overlapping 
identities associated with ethnicity, 
language, religion, etc. Third, we observe a 
multiplicity of variables which dynamically 
interact to ‘produce’ different types, 
channels and outcomes of migration; and 
one of the most significant of these 
variables is migration policy. The overall 
result is the increased number of ‘new, 
multiple-origin, transnationally connected, 
socio-economically differentiated and 
legally stratified immigrants’ who have 
settled in London in recent years (Vertovec 
2007: 1024). 
We shall demonstrate presently how the 
framework of super-diversity has salience 
for our discussion of ‘Turks’ in London; and 
we will also, at the same time, embark on a 
necessary problematisation and elaboration 
of the term ‘Turkish’ when referring to the 
three different groups with varying 
connection – national, ethnic, linguistic – to 
this descriptor. 
Before we do this, we need to set out the 
institutional context which frames our 
research on ‘Turks’ in London. The context 
is the MIGSYS research project, funded by 
the Population, Migration and Environment 
Foundation and the International 
Metropolis Project for 18 months, February 
2006 to August 2007, and directed by Anna 
Triandafyllidou at the Hellenic Foundation 
for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) 
in Athens, Greece. The full title of the 
MIGSYS project is ‘Immigrants, policies and 
migration systems: an ethnographic 
comparative approach’. The comparative 
structure involved small research teams 
carrying out fieldwork on 13 separate but 
overlapping migration systems: Poles in 
 3
Germany and Greece; Ukrainians in 
Hungary, Italy and Poland; Moroccans in 
Belgium, France and Spain; Turks in the 
Netherlands and the UK; and Mexicans in 
California, Missouri and Canada. The 
MIGSYS Final Report consists of an 
integrated summary of all 13 mini- projects, 
including a brief synthesis of our research 
on ‘Turks’ in London (Triandafyllidou and 
Gropas 2007a: 50-3, 77-82). We use the 
vehicle of this Sussex Migration Working 
Paper to describe in more detail the field 
and documentary research carried out in 
London, the results of which were written 
up in two unpublished reports presented to 
MIGSYS workshops in Athens, 30 June–1 
July 2006 and 22–24 February 2007 
(Thomson 2006; Thomson et al. 2007).  
So much for the mechanisms of the project. 
We now elaborate the conceptual 
framework that guided the MIGSYS 
research. Here we can do no better than 
quote Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2007a: 
3): 
[The research] aims at providing a 
better understanding of the 
connection between immigrants’ 
plans and strategies of mobility, 
adaptation and survival, on one 
hand, and receiving country policies, 
on the other (…) More specifically, 
whether and what role these 
policies play in migrants’ decisions 
to migrate, and/or in their plans to 
stay, move on to a different country, 
return to their country of origin, and 
in their overall efforts to adapt to 
the host country environment. 
Key to the MIGSYS analytical frame is the 
concept of ‘nodal points’. These are 
‘moments when a migrants’ decision 
and/or realisation of a migration project 
intersects with a specific policy’ 
(Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007a: 11). 
Five nodal points can be identified in the 
evolution of a migration process over time 
(Triandafyllidou 2005: 5; 2006: 18-20): 
• Decision – to leave or stay, or commute 
or seasonally migrate. Apart from the 
family/household dimension of the decision 
(how much freedom does the individual 
have, what is the role of family networks in 
migration?), relevant policies would include 
encouragement or barriers to migrate from 
a sending state, legal recruitment and entry 
channels from the receiving state, and 
alternative channels such as smuggling or 
clandestine entry and ‘overstaying’.  
• Action – actualising the desire to move 
(or failure to do so). Relevant policies – 
encouragement or control – as above, plus 
the level of information available to the 
migrant at this time.  
• Arrival – as a legal vs. undocumented 
migrant, or asylum-seeker, or 
tourist/student and overstaying. Relevant 
policies relate to housing, education and 
training, employment, health and welfare 
assistance.  
• Adaptation – working and living 
conditions, securing of migrant or refugee 
status. Policies here relate to the broad 
field of social integration, protection from 
discrimination, and other policies listed for 
‘arrival’. 
• Settlement and future – to stay long-term 
or to return ‘home’; or to migrate to another 
destination country; or to adapt to 
circulation and a transnational lifestyle. 
Policies again relate to integration and anti-
racism, plus incentives to return etc. 
We shall see later how these nodal points 
apply to the migrants we interviewed and to 




Interviews with a small sample of migrants 
and key informants were carried out in 
Haringey and Hackney in November and 
December 2006, following the guidelines of 
the MIGSYS project outline (Triandafyllidou 
and Gropas 2007a). The interview structure 
followed the principle of the intersection of 
biographical and policy nodal points 
sketched above, together with a 
complementary set of standard questions 
normally asked to migrants and to people 
working with migrant organisations. 
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Three in-depth interviews were carried out 
with ‘Turkish’ migrants (the names are 
pseudonyms): 
• Lale, a Turkish Cypriot woman in her 50s 
who came to the UK as a school-leaver 
teenager. 
• Hulya, mid-20s, who immigrated from 
mainland Turkey five years ago; and 
• Baran, aged 30, a Kurdish refugee from 
eastern Turkey who arrived in the UK in the 
late 1990s. 
As for interviews with ‘policy-makers’, we 
decided against speaking with 
representatives of national or local 
statutory bodies because we felt that their 
responses would simply mirror official policy 
lines, whose views are readily available 
through official documents and websites 
etc. Instead, we chose to interview people 
working at the interface between policy 
implementation and the lives of our ‘target’ 
migrant populations. These key informants 
were also drawn from amongst the various 
Turkish ‘sub-communities’, although all of 
them had extensive knowledge and 
experience beyond their particular sub-
groups. 
Interviews were held in the language of 
choice of the interviewee – hence English, 
Turkish and Kurdish were used. The 
interviews were taped (with the informants’ 
permission, of course), transcribed and 
translated where necessary. In this paper 
the authors also draw on their wider 
knowledge, both of this part of North 
London and of the communities studied.  
We acknowledge, however, that the small 
size of the sample renders this study more 
in the nature of a pilot investigation. 
Straightaway we must also acknowledge 
here at the outset that the designation 
‘Turkish’ (or ‘Turks’ etc.) is deeply 
problematic, especially for the Kurds from 
Turkey (who resist being called ‘Turkish 
Kurds’), but also, to some extent, for 
Turkish Cypriots (who may identify with 
Cyprus not with Turkey). Within Turkey, 
Kurds have a marginal, persecuted status 
deriving from the failure of the Turkish state 
to recognise them – Article 13 of the 
Turkish Constitution states that ‘in Turkey, 
from the point of view of citizenship, 
everyone is a Turk without regard to race or 
religion’. As we will see later, this 
hegemonic categorisation travels with the 
migrants/refugees to the receiving 
countries, where, despite their persecuted 
status derived from their situation in Turkey 
being the raison d’être of their acceptance 
as refugees and asylum-seekers, they 
continue to be classed as ‘Turkish’. 
Meanwhile, it is also important to 
appreciate that the emergent political and 
social realities amongst Kurdish exile 
communities in Europe have created new 
Kurdish identities and spaces for collective 
action. In particular there is a paradigm 
shift from having an identity imposed from 
Turkey (or from Iran, Iraq or Syria, the other 
countries with Kurdish populations), to a 
‘dreamed, imagined and constructed 
Kurdish identity formed in Kurdistan and in 
Diaspora’ (Keles 2007). Likewise, some 
Cypriots do not want to be subsumed under 
the label of ‘Turks’ as they do not see 
themselves as migrants from the ‘baby 
homeland’ (‘yavru vatan’, a Turkish term for 
Cyprus) but view Cyprus as an independent 
country. This discussion continues in 
Northern Cyprus in terms of the relations 
between native Cypriots and settlers from 
Turkey. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows. Immediately below we describe the 
London setting for the ‘Turkish’ population 
in the UK, drawing on various data sources 
to indicate the size and characteristics of its 
three main constituent groups – Turkish 
Cypriots, mainland Turks, and Kurds from 
Turkey. Next, these three sub-communities 
are portrayed in more detail. We then 
explore the migration process of these 
three groups to London, disaggregated by 
several stages or nodal points: pre-
migration and departure, post-migration 
and adaptation; and settlement or return. In 
conclusion we stress the provisional nature 
of our findings; the diversity of migrants’ 
backgrounds and migration trajectories; 
and key policy issues relating to the groups 
of migrants studied. 
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‘Turks’ in the UK: the London setting 
The 2001 UK Census sparked a great deal 
of interest in who makes up the country’s 
population of nearly 60 million. The census 
confirmed both the long-term increase of 
the foreign-born population over the 
previous half-century, and an accelerated 
increase in the foreign-born during the most 
recent decade, 1991-2001. Thus, whereas 
2.1 million were recorded as foreign-born in 
1951 (4.2 per cent of the total population), 
these figures had more or less doubled to 
4.9 million and 8.3 per cent in 2001. The 
increase in absolute numbers of the 
foreign-born population during the decade 
1991-2001 – 1.1 million – was greater 
than any other intercensal decade, 
considerably exceeding the previous high of 
600,000 during 1961-71. Growth in 
immigration, which has been particularly 
buoyant since 1997, continues into the 
current decade, running at around 500,000 
per year during 2000-03, rising to nearly 
600,000 in 2004, the year of EU 
enlargement when free movement and 
entry into the British labour market were 
open to all citizens of the 10 ‘new’ EU 
countries. The annual outflow of migrants, 
meanwhile, grew much more slowly, 
reaching a plateau at around 350,000 
since 2002.1  
The last ten years or so in Britain have been 
a period of generally less restrictive policies 
towards certain categories of migrants; this 
has coincided with increasing concern 
about rising levels of immigration, reflecting 
the prominence that migration has had in 
the recent political landscape and media 
coverage. Contributing factors to this 
heightened public debate over immigration 
include the growth in numbers claiming 
asylum in the UK, which peaked at 103,000 
in 2002;2 street clashes between British 
                                                 
 
1 The statistics in this paragraph are taken from National 
Statistics Online, under the headings of ‘People and 
Migration’, accessed 19 April 2006 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk). 
 
2 This figure is for asylum applications (84,000) and their 
dependants, and this total amounted to a quarter of all 
non-British immigration in 2002. Asylum applications have 
since declined significantly. 
Asian and white youths in several northern 
industrial towns in 2001; the much-
publicised surge in migration from the A8 
accession countries (especially Poland) 
since 2004; the hidden scale of ‘illegal’ 
immigration; and of course the widespread 
worries over terrorist attacks in the wake of 
those which took place in New York in 2001 
and in London in 2005. The political 
response has, for the most part, aimed to 
tackle undocumented forms of migration 
through tighter border controls and 
measures to discourage fraudulent asylum 
claims. At the same time, though, there has 
been a sea change in thinking as regards 
the role of legal migration in the UK 
economy. No longer does the state aim to 
restrict levels of legal or ‘managed’ 
migration to a minimum; now it explicitly 
ties the UK’s economic interests to 
recruiting migrants to fill particular job 
vacancies and skill shortages in the labour 
market. 
With this general UK immigration context in 
mind, we now pick up the theme of 
superdiversity in order to see where the 
‘Turks’ fit in. First, some official data. In the 
list of ‘foreign-born and without UK 
nationality’ compiled by Salt (2004), those 
with Turkish nationality rank 16th in the UK, 
with 51,000 or 1.8 per cent of the total of 
2.86 million.3 The four largest foreign 
national groups come from Ireland 
(368,000 12.9 per cent), India (171,000, 
6.0 per cent), the USA (155,000, 4.7 per 
cent) and Italy (121,000, 4.2 per cent). 
Intermediate places are taken, in 
descending order of importance, by 
Germany, France, South Africa, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Australia, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, 




                                                 
 
3 This figure is substantially lower than the census 
enumeration of 4.9 million because of the dissonance 
between birthplace, nationality and ethnicity. The foreign-
born include large numbers of immigrants who either had 
British passports at the time of their immigration 
(including some ‘ethnic British’) or who have subsequently 
acquired British nationality by naturalisation. 
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Table 1 London residents by country of birth outside 
the UK, 2001 
Rank Country Number 
    
 1 India 172,162 
 2 Ireland 157,285 
 3 Bangladesh   84,565 
 4 Jamaica   80,319 
 5 Nigeria 68,907 
 6 Pakistan 66,658 
 7 Kenya   66,311 
 8 Sri Lanka   49,932 
 9 Ghana   46,513 
10 Cyprus   45,888 
11 South Africa   45,506 
12 USA   44,602 
13 Australia   41,488 
14 Germany   39,818 
15 Turkey   39,128 
16 Italy   38,694 
17 France   38,130 
18 Somalia   33,831 
19 Uganda   32,082 
20 New Zealand   27,494 
Source: GLA (2005)   
Table 1 shows that, within London, Turks 
have a similar position, 15th, with just over 
39,000, based on birthplace alone. 
However, a very different weighting is 
indicated by Table 2 which gives the 
estimated number of Turkish speakers at 
nearly 74,000, making Turkish the fifth 
most widely spoken language in London 
after English.4  
These data give important insights into the 
position of ‘Turks’ and ‘Turkish-speakers’ 
within the kaleidoscope of multicultural or 
super-diverse London, but they also 
problematise the label ‘Turkish’. In fact, 
three distinct groups need to be recognised: 
Turks (Turkish nationals and Turkish-
speaking), Turkish Cypriots (Turkish-
speaking but coming from Cyprus), and 
Kurds from Turkey (Turkish passport-
holders but ethnically Kurdish). Whilst the 
term ‘Turkish-speaking population’ has 
often been applied to encompass ‘Turks in 
                                                 
 
4 These data on languages spoken come from a large 
survey of 897,000 London schoolchildren, asking which 
languages they speak at home (Baker and Mohideen 
2000). The data may be accused of having methodological 
flaws (Vertovec 2007: 1032-3), but the findings are 
nevertheless remarkable and give a unique insight into 
the linguistic geography of London. Given the date of the 
survey, recently-arrived language groups, for instance from 
Eastern Europe, are greatly under-recorded. 
the UK’ (Enneli 2002; Issa 2005; Mehmet 
Ali 2001), this is clearly offensive to the 
Kurds, who have their own language. 
Changing the label to ‘Turkish-and-Kurdish-
speaking populations’ brings in Kurds from 
Iran and Iraq, who are present in significant 
numbers in the UK. Aspiring to their own 
nation, Kurds also object to being labelled 
as ‘Turkish Kurds’ (or Iraqi Kurds, Syrian 
Kurds etc.). In this paper we try to resolve 
this terminological dilemma by resorting to 
the compromise acronym CTK (Cypriot-
Turkish-Kurdish communities). We opt for 
this, rather than any other sequence (TCK, 
KCT etc.), since it reflects the historical 
order of arrival of the three groups under 
study. 
Table 2. Estimated speakers of top languages in 
London, 2000 
Rank Languages Number 
   
 1 English 5,636,500 
 2  Punjabi    155,700 
 3 Gujerati    149,600 
 4 Hindi/Urdu    136,500 
 5 Bengali/Sylheti    136,300 
 6 Turkish      73,900 
 7 Arabic      53,900 
 8 English Creole      50,700 
 9 Cantonese      47,900 
10 Yoruba      47,600 
11 Greek      31,100 
12 Portuguese      29,400 
13 French      27,600 
14 Akan (Twi and 
Fante) 
     27,500 
15 Spanish      26,700 
16 Somali      22,350 
17 Tamil      19,200 
18 Vietnamese      16,800 
19 Farsi      16,200 
20 Italian      12,300 
  Source: Storkey 
(2000) 
  
There is undoubtedly a perception – largely 
true – that CTK immigrants and their 
descendants have been overlooked in 
research terms, certainly in comparison to 
the larger and more visible minority ethnic 
groups from the Caribbean and South Asia 
(Enneli et al. 2005). A focus on ‘race’ as a 
signifier of difference between white and 
non-white UK residents has left little room 
to consider issues affecting ethnic minority 
groups which somehow escape this 
dichotomised model; and even then studies 
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on the CTK communities are fewer and less 
in-depth than those on other nominally 
‘white’ groups such as the Irish (Jackson 
1963; Walter 2001), the Italians (Colpi 
1993; Sponza 1988) or even the Maltese 
(Dench 1975).5 Enneli et al. (2005) refer to 
‘Turks and Kurds’ as a set of ‘invisible’ and 
‘disadvantaged’ ethnic communities. 
According to Mehmet Ali (1985), the 
‘Turkish-speaking communities’ in the UK 
are a ‘silenced minority’ due to the number 
of racial attacks on them which have gone 
largely unreported. Another factor 
contributing to their ‘invisibility’ is the 
perception that they are a highly self-
sufficient group, for example because many 
find employment in the ‘ethnic economy’ in 
labour-market niches such as coffee-shops 
and kebab houses. Their strong kinship and 
social networks, however, disguise many 
social problems faced by these 
communities, a significant number of 
whose members live in some of the most 
deprived areas of London. CTK populations 
are disproportionately engaged in low-wage 
employment, whilst many of the youth leave 
education with few qualifications. Another 
concern is the poor level of English amongst 
many first-generation immigrants. 
 
CTK communities: shades of invisibility and 
deprivation  
In this section of the paper we describe the 
three groups that make up the CTK 
population in London. Using a combination 
of secondary sources and our own 
interviews with immigrant and key 
community members, we delve into some 
social, economic and political aspects of 
the three communities, concentrating on 
areas of disadvantage that they suffer. 
The three groups – Turkish Cypriots, 
mainland Turks, and Kurds from Turkey – 
arrived at different albeit overlapping times 
and for different sets of reasons. 
 
                                                 
 
5 The extent to which these various ethno-national groups 
(including CTK migrants) are, indeed, ‘white’ is, of course, 
an issue for debate, which will not be followed up here. 
Turkish Cypriots 
The Turkish Cypriots were the first to 
immigrate. Although a trickle had arrived in 
the 1930s, the main influx took place in the 
1950s and 1960s. The British influence 
(Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 
until 1960, when the island acquired 
independence) made the UK the 
destination of choice. Arrivals peaked in 
1960-61, years that coincided with the 
withdrawal of British troops and the loss of 
well-paid jobs tied to the British colonial 
presence, and preceded the 
implementation of the UK Immigration Act 
of 1962. Hence this was an economic 
migration, driven to some extent by poverty 
and the opportunity to ‘make good money’ 
in Britain (Ladbury 1977: 303); but also, 
especially after the increase in inter-
communal tension between the numerically 
dominant Greek Cypriots and the 
progressively marginalised Turkish Cypriots 
after 1963, by political motives too. Postwar 
London, meanwhile, offered plentiful 
opportunities for workers in a range of 
industrial and service occupations, as well 
as for some small-scale entrepreneurs. As 
one of our interviewees revealed, the 
attraction of Britain was especially strong 
for those regaled with ‘stories about how 
beautiful the country was, how democratic, 
and how lifestyle was good [with] 
opportunities for everyone’ (Lale, female, 
mid-50s, immigrated aged 19, now works in 
the care sector). 
The Turkish Cypriot migration, like the 
movements of Greek Cypriots to Britain 
which occurred alongside it (see 
Constantinides 1977), was mainly a family 
migration; the intention was to settle in the 
UK, but to retain a Turkish Cypriot identity 
and links to Cyprus (Ladbury 1977). 
According to Robins and Aksoy (2001: 690), 
Turkish Cypriots emphasised their affinity to 
the ‘British way of life’ as a pragmatic 
attempt to be accepted. They were assisted 
by earlier-settled Greek Cypriots in finding 
accommodation and employment – the 
latter predominantly in the textile and 
dressmaking industries and in hotels, 
restaurants and snack-bars in London. 
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Soon, many Turkish Cypriots established 
their own business in these sectors. 
An interesting subplot in the story of Turkish 
Cypriot migration concerns their bi-
communal relations with Greek Cypriots. 
The two communities emigrated in roughly 
the same proportions as their demographic 
distribution in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots 
outnumbered Turkish Cypriots by four to 
one. But, unlike the growing inter-
communal tensions back in Cyprus, with a 
virtual civil war during the years 1963-64 
and then a brutal partition of the island in 
1974, it appears that relations between the 
two communities in Britain remained 
reasonably cordial. This was partly because 
of their mutual, but unequal, dependence 
(Turkish Cypriots being more reliant on 
Greek Cypriots than vice versa), and partly 
because much of the migration to Britain 
occurred during a period of more 
harmonious co-existence, before the violent 
clashes which started in 1963 (Ladbury 
1977).6 
Regarding Turkish Cypriot numbers in the 
UK, there are only indirect indications. UK 
census birth-place records do not 
distinguish Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
Successive censuses point to stable 
numbers of Cypriot-born since the main 
influx during the 1950s and 1960s: there 
were 72,665 in 1971, rising somewhat to 
84,327 in 1981 (probably due to some 
renewed emigration as a result of the 
partition and displacement of both 
populations in 1974), then falling slightly to 
78,191 in 1991 and 77,156 in 2001. 
Constantinides (1977: 272) suggested that 
the 1971 figure should be doubled to 
140,000 to account for the second 
generation born in Britain, whilst Ladbury 
(1977: 305) estimated the Turkish Cypriot 
community at approximately 40,000 in the 
mid-1970s. Writing a quarter of a century 
(and therefore almost a generation) later, 
Robins and Aksoy (2001: 689) give an 
                                                 
 
6 This is not the place for a detailed examination of the 
‘Cyprus problem’: for an overview see King and Ladbury 
(1982). There was, however, a further pulse of emigration 
in the mid-1970s, following partition (Hatay 2007: 
Appendix 2). 
estimate of 100,000, and claim that this is 
more than the 80,000 Turkish Cypriots 
remaining in Cyprus, where they now live in 
the self-proclaimed (but not internationally 
recognised) Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, along with large numbers of post-
partition settlers from Turkey.7 More 
recently, Enneli et al. (2005) quote an 
estimate of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots –
Cyprus-born plus second and third 
generations – living in the UK. 
The geographical distribution of Turkish 
Cypriots in London reflects, but is not 
identical to, the parallel Greek Cypriot 
migration, and has in turn influenced 
subsequent immigration of Turks and 
Kurds. According to Ladbury (1977: 306), 
Turkish Cypriots initially settled slightly to 
the east of the main areas of Greek Cypriot 
settlement, which were in Camden and 
Islington. Turkish Cypriots were also more 
likely than Greek Cypriots to locate south of 
the river. Like the Greek Cypriots, and 
reflecting a history of settlement which now 
dates back over fifty years and hence 
includes the progressive residential 
scattering of the second and third 
                                                 
 
7 According to a recent analysis by Hatay (2007), there is a 
‘war of numbers’ over the population of Northern Cyprus, 
due largely to the disputed quantity of immigrant-settlers 
from Turkey. Provisional results of the 2006 census of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) give a de jure 
population of 256,644 (the de facto enumeration was 
265,100, including visitors and tourists). Of the de jure 
total, 178,031 were TRNC citizens, 70,525 were Turkish 
citizens, and 8,088 were other nationalities. Of the 
178,031 TRNC citizens 147,405 were Cyprus-born, 
27,333 were Turkish-born (indicating that TRNC 
citizenship has been given to substantial numbers of 
Turkish settlers), and 2,482 were UK-born (mainly second-
generation ‘returnees’). And of the 147,405 Cyprus-born 
TRNC citizens, 120,031 have both parents born in Cyprus, 
16,824 have both parents born in Turkey (hence these are 
‘second-generation’ Turks in the TRNC), and 10,361 have 
one parent born in Cyprus and one born in Turkey 
(reflecting the substantial amount of intermarriage that 
has taken place between ‘native’ Turkish Cypriots and 
settler Turks). From all this we can deduce that there are 
around 120,000 ‘pure’ Turkish Cypriots in Northern 
Cyprus, roughly the same number as the latest estimate 
for the Turkish Cypriot community in the UK. The Robins-
Aksoy figure of 80,000 reflects politically-motivated under-
estimates from the Republic of Cyprus government (the 
only internationally  recognised government for the island, 
but which only controls the southern 60 per cent of the 
territory, where the Greek Cypriots live), which has been 
concerned to portray the Turkish Cypriot population as 
‘shrinking’ in the face of massive immigration from Turkey. 
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generations, there has been a process of 
suburbanisation away from the inner-city 
districts, moving north along the Haringey 
axis to Enfield, and southward to Croydon 
(cf. King and Bridal 1982 for Greek 
Cypriots). This outward diffusion of the 
Turkish Cypriots away from their initial core 
areas, which were never very dense or 
visible in the first place, makes them today 
an even more ‘invisible’ group in the ethnic 
social geography of London. Robins and 
Aksoy (2001) sensitively explore this 
invisibility in terms of Turkish Cypriots’ 
suspension between three more dominant 
spheres of cultural identity: British society, 
within which they are now rather 
successfully integrated; Greek-dominated 
Cypriotness; and the (mainland) Turkish 
sphere which has both political resonance 
in terms of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and 
cultural importance in terms of the later 
waves of Turkish immigration into London. 
A further symbol of Turkish Cypriots’ lack of 
visibility is the remarkable dearth of 
academic research on this group. 
 
Mainland Turks 
Following the Turkish Cypriots, Turks from 
the mainland were the second of the three 
groups to arrive. Like the other two groups, 
they are overwhelmingly concentrated in 
London. The 2001 Census recorded 
54,000 Turkish-born but this figure is 
subject to two important caveats: it includes 
Turkish-born Kurds, and it excludes second-
generation Turks. 
The arrival patterns of the mainland Turks 
were quite different from the Turkish 
Cypriots who preceded them. The first Turks 
to arrive, in the early 1970s, were single 
men who were joined by their wives and 
children later in the decade. To some extent 
this model of migration replicated the much 
larger migration of Turkish (and Kurdish) 
‘guestworkers’ to Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, Belgium and Austria in 
the 1960s and 1970s.8 Most of the young 
                                                 
 
8 The Turkish communities in these categories count 1.8 
million in Germany (2005), 352,000 in the Netherlands 
(2004), 174,000 in France (1999), 125,000 in Austria 
(2001) and 47,000 in Belgium (2002); data are from 
men migrating to the UK in the 1970s came 
originally from rural areas, but had often 
migrated internally to one of Turkey’s big 
cities prior to their international move 
(Mehmet Ali 2001). The military coup in 
Turkey in 1980 brought a second wave of 
Turkish migrants to the UK, this time largely 
made up of intellectuals, students, trade 
union activists and professionals, with 
mainly urban origins (Erdemir and Vasta 
2007). Like Turkish Cypriots, Turks in the 
UK have been very little researched; the 
significance of this neglect is different 
between the two groups. For the Turkish 
Cypriots the lacuna is perhaps more acute 
because the UK is by far the major 
destination for this emigration – other, 
minor, destinations include Australia, 
Canada and Turkey. For Turks, there has 
been abundant research on their other 
European destinations, especially Germany 
and the Netherlands. 
Some of our key informants spoke about 
the relationship between the Turkish 
Cypriots and the Turks during the 1970s. 
The former were quick to create small 
businesses, as noted above, and thus 
opened up employment opportunities for 
mainland Turks. 
In 1971, because of the initiative of 
the Turkish Cypriot employers in 
London there was a special 
agreement between Turkey and 
England to bring tailors to work in 
sweatshops in the textile industry 
(interview, Hackney Refugee 
Forum). 
Then we would slowly see Turkish 
Cypriots opening restaurants and 
going to Turkey to bring in chefs and 
cooks to help… Turkish Cypriots 
never had that kind of experience 
with cooking Turkish food and 
kebab style, so therefore [mainland] 
Turks started coming in by getting 
work permits (interview, Turkish-
Kurdish Community Centre). 
                                                                           
Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2007b: 24, 37, 117, 133, 
252). Apart from the different years, these figures are not 
strictly comparable because of different recording systems 
in the countries concerned. 
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Work permits had to be renewed every year; 
Turks became residents after five years’ 
legal residence. Many still retain their 
Turkish nationality, mainly to protect their 
rights in Turkey, such as land ownership 
(Issa 2005: 8). 
Another channel or nodal point for Turkish 
immigration arose out of the Ankara 
Agreement, signed in 1963 between Turkey 
and the EU, which facilitated the migration 
of Turkish entrepreneurs to Europe. After 
Britain’s accession to the EU in 1973, some 
thousands of small businesses were set up 
by Turkish migrants, mainly as restaurant 
and café owners. 
 
Kurds from Turkey 
Migration from Turkey rose again at the end 
of the 1980s as the conflict between the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the 
Turkish government displaced thousands of 
Kurdish people from eastern and south-
eastern Turkey.  Whilst a significant number 
came as students or under a business visa, 
many sought asylum in the UK, often having 
been forcibly removed from their villages in 
eastern Turkey and ending up as 
involuntary internal migrants in the 
country’s big cities. The graph of asylum-
seekers from Turkey (most of whom are 
likely to be Kurdish) peaked at 4,650 in 
1989. The response from the UK 
government at the time, which believed that 
many of these asylum-seekers were really 
‘economic migrants’, was to impose visa 
controls on all Turkish nationals coming to 
the UK. Asylum applications from Turkey fell 
to a fluctuating plateau of around 1,500-
2,000 per year throughout the 1990s, but 
then rose to a new annual peak of around 
4,000 in the early 2000s, since when there 
has been a rather rapid decline to below 
1,000 by mid-decade (Griffiths 2002; Home 
Office 2006). Alongside the asylum route, 
other Kurds have arrived clandestinely or 
remained as ‘overstayers’. 
The progressive hardening of asylum rules 
over the past 15 years through increased 
use of detention, restricting rights of 
appeal, limiting access to welfare and 
removing rights to work has made life 
difficult for the Kurds (and other asylum 
populations). Refugees’ housing and 
welfare needs were taken up by voluntary 
organisations and the church (Wahlbeck 
1999: 72-4, 156-9). Like the Turkish 
Cypriots and mainland Turks before them, 
Kurdish refugees from Turkey built on 
already-existing networks of support to help 
them settle in the UK, although many found 
it difficult to find steady employment and 
save money. This was partly due to the less 
favourable economic conditions they faced 
in the early 1990s. In particular, the textile 
industry – a sector which, over previous 
decades, had provided employment for 
many in the Turkish-speaking communities 
– had significantly declined. Especially for 
Kurdish women, access to employment was 
made more difficult by their poor English 
language skills and lack of education and 
training. Unlike Turkish Cypriot women, they 
do not have a tradition of skilled 
dressmaking; neither do they have the 
opportunity to learn such skills through 
training at work since much of the labour in 
this field is carried out at home and paid on 
piece rates (Enneli 2002). Meanwhile for 
Kurdish men, employment in small retail 
and service outlets (coffee and kebab 
houses, hairdressers, florists etc.) has been 
subject to growing competition and 
tightening margins, with the effect that the 
work available is increasingly casual, low-
paid and subject to long hours. 
Three important, and related, issues 
pertinent to the Kurds from Turkey are their 
distinctive cultural identity within the CTK 
community, the question of their numbers, 
and their condition of political exile. We 
take each in turn. 
Asylum statistics mask Kurdish origin, for 
Kurdish asylum-seekers are recorded as 
coming from Turkey (or Iraq, Iran etc.). The 
history of Kurdish flight to Europe tells us 
that Kurds formed the majority of 
applications from Turkey in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Kurds from Turkey are 
simply subsumed under the category of 
Turks, and then when in the UK as part of 
the ‘Turkish-speaking community’. This 
leads to a situation where ‘not only has 
Kurdish origin been masked prior to leaving 
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Turkey… it is also hidden from the moment 
of arrival on foreign soil’ (Laiser 1996: 
127). As a staff member of a Kurdish-
Turkish community centre9 based in North 
London told us: 
Kurds are very different from 
Turkish culture, Turkish identity. Our 
language is different from the 
Turkish language. We are two 
different ethnicities. We are not the 
same ethnicity, nor is Turkish the 
nationality that covers everyone. I 
mean, back in Turkey, on the 
passport it’s written Turkish 
citizenship but that doesn’t mean 
you’re Turkish – that’s a big 
problem. 
There remains a sense amongst the 
Kurdish population in the UK that their 
culture and language are very much 
undervalued. Authors have spoken of the 
‘Turkish-speaking population’ as an 
‘invisible minority’ (Enneli et al. 2005), but 
the fact that Kurds are routinely registered 
as Turks with local authorities in the UK 
lends weight to the argument that they 
themselves represent a particularly 
neglected ethnic group. This is why their 
community organisations insist that using 
the term ‘Turkish-speaking community’ is 
not neutral: it implies that ‘Turkish Kurds’ 
somehow ‘belong’ to Turkey, and that their 
separate Kurdish identity does not merit 
recognition. Their claims as a people and 
nation are at times found to be at odds with 
anti-terrorist legislation in the UK and with 
the UK’s position in favour of Turkey joining 
the EU.10 
                                                 
 
9 In practice, the centres which call themselves ‘Turkish 
and Kurdish community centres’ are either Turkish- or 
Kurdish-dominated, with a very small minority of Turkish 
Cypriots involved. 
 
10 Since the enactment of the 2001 Terrorism Act in the 
UK, the PKK has been listed as a terrorist organisation by 
the UK government. Kurds from Turkey who claim asylum 
in the UK stating persecution due to membership of, or 
association with, the PKK could risk imprisonment under 
the Terrorism Act. At the same time (2000) the Kurdish 
television station MED-TV, which was broadcast from the 
UK, was closed down by the British government due to 
breaches of impartiality and claims that it incited people to 
commit criminal acts. These events highlight how diaspora 
politics and the struggle for Kurdish national recognition 
Second, the issue of numbers throws up 
parallels with the Cypriots: just as Turkish 
Cypriots cannot be distinguished in the 
census from Greek Cypriots, so Kurds 
originating from Turkey cannot be 
separated from the overall Turkey-born 
(54,000 in 2001). In one of our earlier 
reports (Thomson 2006: 20) we gave an 
estimate of 50,000 for the ‘Kurds from 
Turkey’ population in the UK. Key 
informants interviewed at the end of 2006 
gave estimates which ranged from 70,000 
up to 150,000. As the following quote 
shows, inaccurate base data in part 
explains these wide statistical variations:  
You can go to the school database… 
the majority of Kurds are still 
registered as Turkish or Turkish 
Cypriots. You go into a school. They 
have 500 kids; they say – oh they’re 
all Turkish. You speak to the kids, 
you speak with their families – 
they’re all Kurdish (Director, Turkish 
and Kurdish Community Centre). 
Demographic structure also plays a role 
here. Key informants stressed the young 
age structure of the Kurds and the large 
size of their families. This impression is 
supported by a report from Haringey Council 
(1997) which similarly suggested that the 
majority of Kurds in London at that time 
were under 40 years of age and had 
families of five or more members. Given the 
timing of their arrival, the other two CTK 
communities – especially the Turkish 
Cypriots – are much older. Indeed the 
Turkish Cypriot community includes a 
growing number of elderly, some of whom 
find themselves socially isolated and 
unable to access public services as a result 
of poor health and still rudimentary English. 
Third, their later arrival and the political 
nature of their exile give the Kurds a 
different experience of migration in the UK. 
The Kurdish community tends, more than 
the other two groups, to keep to itself, 
particularly through membership of 
associations which (though not exclusively) 
tend to have a strong political engagement 
                                                                           
have the potential to escalate into a sensitive political 
issue between the UK and Turkey. 
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with the ‘Kurdish cause’. The Kurds’ 
political exile from Turkey has granted them 
a freedom in London (and elsewhere in the 
Kurdish diaspora) to express their claims 
for recognition of Kurdish identity and the 
Kurdish nation (Wahlbeck 1999). Newroz – 
an ancient spring celebration for Kurds and 
Persians – became an intensely political 
occasion in London during the 1990s 
because of its explicit celebration of 
Kurdish culture and identity. Wahlbeck 
(1999: 170) interestingly notes, in his 
observations of the Newroz festival, that ‘no 
banners carried calls to fight unemployment 
among [Kurdish] refugees or fight racism in 
the neighbourhood’. Compared to Turks 
and Turkish Cypriots, Kurdish men are more 
likely to be unemployed (not least because, 
as asylum-seekers, they are not allowed to 
work). Meanwhile, growing resentment 
amongst sections of the UK population 
towards refugees and asylum claimants has 
also meant that some Kurdish pupils in 
schools have been reluctant to identify 
themselves as refugees for fear of being 
victimised or bullied (Enneli et al. 2005). 
High rates of Kurdish pupils are excluded 
from schools; in fact, many members of the 
CTK communities in general do not feel 
their education in the UK was a good 
experience. As Enneli et al. (2005:13) 
explain in their ongoing research on young 
Turks and Kurds in London, schools can be 
an ‘alienating environment’ for many due to 
lack of teacher support and to lack of 
understanding of the specific needs of 
Turkish and, especially, Kurdish children. 
Their research also points out, however, 
that this picture of educational 
disenchantment and failure, and the 
consequent growth of what is referred to as 
a ‘destructive peer culture’ of Turkish and 
Kurdish gang groups, tend to conceal the 
achievements of other students from the 
same ethnic groups. These achievements 
have allowed some members of the 
community to enter professions such as 
law, accountancy and teaching, although 
they tend then to move away from the more 
deprived areas of initial settlement. 
Two of the common indicators of social 
deprivation – the number of people in 
rented social housing and the percentage 
entitled to free school meals – give a good 
idea of the relative status of the Kurds vis-
à-vis the other two CTK communities. In 
Haringey, 30 per cent of its CTK residents 
live in social housing, whilst nearly eight out 
of ten Kurdish pupils had free school meals, 
compared to two-thirds of mainland Turks 
and half of Turkish Cypriots – the average 
for all pupils in the borough being four out 
of ten (Enneli et al. 2005: 10). 
One final point: not only do the Kurdish 
numbers become conflated and confused 
with the statistics and estimates on ‘Turks’, 
but there is also an overlap with Cyprus. 
After the Turkish incursion into Cyprus in 
1974, which resulted in the island’s 
partition, the Turkish government brought 
about 17,000 Kurds from Agri and Mus in 
eastern Turkey to North Cyprus; their 
number has since grown to around 38,000. 
Our estimates suggest that today about 
10,000 ‘Kurdish Cypriots’ are in Britain. 
 
The migration process 
Here we follow Castles’ conceptualisation of 
the migration process as something wider 
than the simple move from one country to 
another; it includes both the situation 
before migration as well as the situation 
after, together with potential return 
migration and the impact on subsequent 
generations (Castles 2000: 15-16). Our 
account here draws on the ‘nodal points’ 
framework outlined in the introduction. We 
try to tease out the various stages in the 
migration process where different policies 
can be seen to have influenced, directly or 
indirectly, the decision and lives of those 
interviewed; or indeed where policy 
appeared to have little or no influence. 
 
Before migrating, and the departure 
In all three of the migrant life-story 
interviews it was clear that the choice of 
Britain as the country of destination related 
less to specific policy measures such as 
migrant recruitment schemes (e.g. that 
signed by West Germany and Turkey in 
1961), and more to the presence of close 
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family members living abroad. This is less 
surprising when we consider that all three 
emigrated when relatively young (late teens 
or early twenties) and none had emigrated 
before. 
Whilst they all migrated alone, two were 
able to rely on their families for financial 
help, advice and the security of a place to 
stay upon arrival. 
Turkish-Cypriot Lale works as a nurse in 
London, where she has been living for 37 
years since leaving her parental home in 
Larnaca after finishing her studies in high 
school. Life in socially-conservative Cyprus 
at that time, with its limited career 
opportunities for women, did not appeal to 
her: 
The girls were all expected to get 
married, have children and things 
like that. And somewhere something 
went wrong and I just rebelled 
against that kind of thing – I wanted 
more for my life. I couldn’t see 
myself getting married and… I 
decided that I would escape by 
emigrating, and the first choice was 
England because that was a kind of 
mother country… 
As noted earlier, the UK was the ‘obvious’ 
destination for emigrant Cypriots at that 
time, for they had grown up under British 
colonial rule. Then, after independence in 
1960, post-colonial Cyprus entered a period 
of political turmoil and civil war which 
adversely affected social relations and life 
opportunities, especially for the minority 
Turkish Cypriots. These turbulent years – 
the 1960s and early 1970s – also 
reinforced traditional gender relations in 
less well-off families: Lale’s being a case in 
point. 
I remember after the creation of the 
Cyprus Republic, things changed. 
There was political turmoil in 
Cyprus. We were deprived of many 
things, such as education. I come 
from quite a poor family, and 
although my father was a 
policeman, we were eight children 
and we didn’t have enough to go 
around. Priority was given to the 
boys’ education. 
Against this backdrop of political and 
economic crisis in Cyprus, the UK 
represented a world apart: a virtual idyll for 
a young Lale determined to make the most 
of her life. But there were further family 
network factors which proved crucial in 
Lale’s decision, and ability, to move to 
London in 1969. Her father had spent some 
time in England in the 1950s and returned 
with vivid stories. And later, her mother – by 
that time divorced from her father – would 
move to England to start a new life for 
herself, so that Lale had a base to stay 
when she arrived. 
I heard a lot of stories from my 
father when I was a young child. He 
came back with lots of pictures. I 
saw how women were treated. He 
told us women were very liberated 
and educated in England, and that 
idea kind of appealed to me 
because I wanted to become 
someone. I wanted to take control 
of my life. I wanted to feel that, yes, 
I am important as a woman and that 
my ideas count. 
Some of Lale’s reasons for moving to the 
UK echoed those of her compatriots of the 
time. Lack of opportunities at home, 
coupled with the promise of a richer and 
more fulfilling life in the UK, would 
persuade tens of thousands of Turkish (and 
Greek) Cypriots to migrate, primarily to 
London, in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Constantinides 1977; Ladbury 1977). Yet 
Lale’s case is unusual in that she migrated 
alone on a journey of personal liberation 
and self-discovery; most other Turkish 
Cypriot women migrated with, or to join, 
their husbands who were regarded as the 
primary migrants and breadwinners 
(Ladbury 1977). 
The case of Hulya, 25, from mainland 
Turkey, has some similarities to Lale’s story, 
even though their migrations occurred more 
than 30 years apart. Like Lale, Hulya had 
family (her mother, sister and brother) 
already living in the UK; and she felt, albeit 
to a lesser degree, some affiliation to this 
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country. Here is an extract from her 
interview: 
My main reasons [for migrating to 
the UK] were that my family lives 
here and I also came to learn 
English. I wanted to learn English as 
I think [it] is the most important 
language in the world. Another 
reason was that I was aware that 
the UK has a very good education 
system; as I am [was] a teacher in 
Turkey, so I wanted to see for myself 
how they manage here… I also 
always followed the news when I 
was in Turkey about the English 
education system, so that’s why I 
came to this country… My family has 
lived in this country for a long time. 
By her own admission, Hulya was in a more 
privileged position than most other 
migrants as she could travel to Europe 
without a visa on a special ‘green’ 
passport.11 This passport allows its holders 
to stay up to three months in a European 
country, and is issued to government 
officials and civil servants, including 
teachers, in recognition of their service to 
the Turkish state. The passports are also 
issued to their wives and children. Although 
Hulya would subsequently have to apply for 
a student visa to enable her to prolong her 
stay in the UK, the green passport allows its 
holders to gain first-hand experience of life 
in a European country of their choice.  
This leads us to the case of Baran, a 
Kurdish refugee who, like many Kurds in 
the 1990s, felt compelled to flee Turkey 
because, in his own words, ‘I couldn’t 
develop myself as a Kurd in reading or 
writing Kurdish in Turkey’.12 Born in a small 
                                                 
 
11 The EU has expressed concerns that too many of these 
passports have been issued in recent years, including 
some whose ‘service’ to the Turkish state appears highly 
dubious. 
 
12  This story is corroborated in a recent detailed 
newspaper report on a Kurdish family in the UK who fled 
Turkey in the late 1980s. The report describes how both 
parents in the family had been jailed on several occasions 
simply because they refused to change their Kurdish 
names to Turkish ones, and because they insisted on 
speaking Kurdish rather than Turkish (Taylor and 
Hattonstone 2007). 
town in eastern Turkey, Baran fled initially 
with his family to Malatya province in 
central-eastern Turkey after his father, a 
village headman, refused to join the village 
guard or Koruculuk system, created by the 
Turkish state to counter the Kurdish 
national movement.13 Baran fled to Turkey 
after being arrested several times, the last 
time because he knew he had been 
identified as a potential ‘criminal’ for having 
taken part in a student demonstration. He 
sought asylum in the UK after his brother, 
who lives in Germany, advised against 
joining him there: 
 There were two options in my 
mind, Germany and the UK. I could 
flee to Germany because I studied 
German at university… I could have 
gone to Germany and continued my 
education there, it could have been 
an advantage for me… But from 
stories my brother told me… and 
from the newspaper reports about 
Kurdish migrants, I understood that 
Germany mistreats asylum-seekers, 
and even migrants who have lived 
there for 30 years. For example, if 
you are seeking refuge in Germany, 
unfortunately you are not allowed to 
leave the district where you are 
registered. You are allowed to travel 
only 20km [sic: 35km] during your 
application for asylum. It is like a 
prison. This law affected my 
decision not to flee to Germany.14 
(…) I heard that the UK is a country 
                                                 
 
13 The Koruculuk system has been criticised for its 
implication in criminal activity. The system uses Kurdish 
villagers, who often face pressure to join, to control remote 
areas in the east and south-east of the country. The 1998 
Human Rights Watch Report highlighted the large-scale 
detention of Kurdish villagers who had refused to join the 
guard system (Human Rights Watch 1998). 
 
14 Germany has been widely criticised for being the only 
EU member state where these residency restrictions, 
known as Residenzpflicht, are in place. Asylum-seekers 
and people with temporary leave to remain require 
permission from the local authorities in order to leave their 
district. A permit costs 20 Euro. Without one, an asylum-
seeker or person with temporary leave to remain found 
35km or more outside their district of registration is liable 
to be fined. In addition, transgressions are added to the 
criminal records published by the Federal Criminal Office 
and result in a higher rate of criminal offences being 
accredited to non-nationals.   
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of freedom. At least that’s what I 
was told... I chose the UK to feel 
freer… But now I know that it cannot 
be said fully that the UK is a country 
of freedom. 
The interview with Baran reveals how 
migrants and asylum-seekers gather 
information about potential destinations 
(e.g. Germany and the UK) before deciding 
where to move. Often, however, this 
information is misleading. Policy, especially 
rules on asylum, is subject to frequent 
change. Whilst Baran gained quite accurate 
information about the Residenzpflicht law 
in Germany, he was clearly unaware of 
some aspects of the treatment of asylum-
seekers in the UK. He was unusual in that 
he chose to trust his impressions of the UK 
as a ‘land of freedom’, and decided against 
joining his brother in Germany where he 
would at least have had family support 
nearby. Baran’s disillusionment started as 
soon as he landed in Britain. What 
happened was that he travelled on a false 
passport and was held at the airport for two 
days before being sent to prison (an ironic 
event given his earlier description of 
Germany as a prison). His eventual release 
from prison was secured by his brother’s 
wife, who had previously lived in the UK. 
 
Relevance of policies  
Regarding the migrants’ knowledge of 
policies, and their relevance to individuals’ 
mobility, this varies from case to case. 
Lale’s case is the most straightforward. The 
combination of her ‘youthful naivety’ (as 
she said herself) and her strong desire for 
personal freedom meant that her main 
thought was to escape the political troubles 
that were afflicting life in Cyprus. 
Well, initially I didn’t think I would 
need any kind of visa… just some 
kind of identity called a passport. 
Having said that, it wasn’t an easy 
thing because by then the island 
was already divided, or segregated 
politically. The island was 
dominated by the Greek [i.e. Greek 
Cypriot] government… and there 
was no freedom of movement 
[within the island]. Everything was 
under the control of the Greek 
[Cypriot] authorities, and it meant I 
had to travel from Larnaca to 
Nicosia to get a passport. That was 
almost unimaginable because we 
were not allowed to move from one 
town to another without getting 
special permission… but eventually 
[because my father was a 
policeman] he had some 
underground connections, and I got 
a passport. 
As well as helping his daughter obtain her 
passport, Lale’s father also paid for her 
ticket to London. Hulya was also supported 
by her father in her move to the UK, using 
the special-concession green passport.  
Much more problematic policy regulations 
confronted Baran, who was only able to 
take action with the paid help of a smuggler 
and a fake passport. 
I came to this country in one day by 
plane. We changed plane at an 
airport I don’t know where because 
a smuggler had arranged my 
travel... I came here illegally with a 
passport which was prepared by the 
smuggler, and I applied for asylum 
at the airport. 
Interestingly, none of the three migrants 
referred to welfare provisions as factors in 
their choice of destination country. In fact, 
their knowledge of the UK’s laws and 
institutions was at best limited, as this 
quote from Hulya illustrates: 
I had little knowledge about the 
United Kingdom apart from the 
things I heard from other people… 
who had been here for a long time. 
For instance, I used to hear that the 
government gives houses to people, 
and I used to get confused as to 
why they did this. But I never really 
tried to find out. 
Similarly, Baran explained that: 
 … before coming to this country I 
knew nothing about the institutions, 
laws etc. Because of this I spent 
three months learning about 
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different institutions, and how they 
work. I got this information from 
friends who arrived here before me. 
For example, how I can find a job, 
open a bank account… 
Baran’s account is a healthy antidote 
against claims that generous welfare 
provisions attract asylum-seekers, and that 
restricting rules on work and levels of 
financial support will deter applications for 
asylum. He also understood that life in 
Europe would not be as easy as the Turkish 
migrants working in Germany made out 
during their trips back home: 
If you immigrate to another country, 
you have cultural, linguistic and 
other difficulties… When the 
Alamanci (Turkish migrants in 
Germany) told us about how 
comfortable and pleasurable life 
was in Europe… I laughed at them, I 
knew they were working 14, 15 
hours a day.  I knew their life 
consisted only of working, eating 
and sleeping… When I came here I 
wasn’t disappointed because I 
already knew what to expect. But I 
was forced to choose this way. 
This account of three migrant journeys to 
the UK suggests that policy is often only a 
peripheral consideration in the choice of 
destination country. For Lale and Hulya, the 
UK represented a natural choice because 
this country appeared the best context in 
which their personal goals could be fulfilled 
– in Hulya’s case to learn English and in 
Lale’s to feel more emancipated. The 
presence of family in the UK provided both 
of them with housing and other support on 
their arrival to London. Baran, on the other 
hand, was guided by his reaction to policy 
– the strict residency rules in Germany for 
asylum-seekers – to inform his choice of 
destination. In the mistaken belief that 
there would be no restrictions on his 
personal freedom in Britain, he chose not 




Arrival and adaptation 
Family networks continued to play a crucial 
role in helping the newly-arrived migrants 
adapt to life in London. Both Lale and Hulya 
stayed initially with their mothers, as noted 
above. Personal connections were also 
important, both within and across the 
individual CTK communities. Ethnic 
boundaries were both meaningful and fluid. 
Turkish Cypriots’ status as the first to arrive, 
and their strategic positionality (as both 
‘Turkish’ and ‘Cypriot’), enabled them to 
interact with both Greek Cypriots (who were 
often their landlords and employers in the 
early years) and mainland Turks (whom, in 
turn, they often employed in their own small 
businesses). Kurds from Turkey also faced 
in two directions: towards the wider Turkish-
speaking community, and to the wider 
Kurdish community. Alliances were 
strategically instrumentalised according to 
necessity and opportunities. 
Once arrived, two key channels for 
immigrants’ survival and progression are 
housing and employment. Lale’s account of 
her early years in London revealed both the 
self-sufficiency of the (Turkish) Cypriot 
community and the initial economic 
hardship, as renting rooms in shared 
properties left little room for privacy and 
saving. Her efforts to find work also 
revealed the level of gender-based 
discrimination in the workplace in the early 
1970s, as well as the deskilling that often 
had to be endured: 
I had typing skills… [but] they told 
me all, no, we haven’t got any jobs 
in the office. I felt really patronised 
and intimidated and I thought, how 
dare you, you know, I am better 
than that. I want to work in an 
office… weeks and weeks [went by], 
I couldn’t find any [office] jobs so I 
had to put my tail between my legs 
and I went back to the factory, and I 
said to the boss, please can you 
give me that job in the factory? So 
he says yeah, and that’s how I 
started my first job. And I felt really 
degraded because I had great 
hopes and expectations… of 
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working and having an equal life. I 
actually found out that we were 
doing the same job in the factory, 
yet boys were getting £13 [a week] 
and I was getting £7. 
Baran, too, underwent deskilling after his 
release from prison, negating his university 
studies. As an asylum-seeker in the late 
1990s, he was not entitled to work for six 
months after lodging his claim.15 After six 
months, he found part-time work in a textile 
factory, employed by a fellow-Kurd. But this 
was hardly what he aspired to and, as the 
following quote suggests, served only to 
delay his attempts to rebuild his life in 
Britain: 
I worked for two years in the textile 
industry. I thought this type of work 
is not for me because it can give me 
nothing but money. I wanted to do 
something from which I can learn 
something and develop myself, and 
be happy with what I do. 
However, like Lale,  who then trained as a 
nurse, Baran also ‘moved on’, taking 
courses in order to access more fulfilling 
work, this time with his migrant community: 
Then I worked in different projects 
related to migrants… and the 
Kurdish and Turkish community. I 
worked for the Kurdish radio station 
for four years. These jobs were part-
time because I was also studying 
media and film at university… Now I 
work for a local Kurdish 
newspaper… Last year, I shot my 
first short film… 
Hulya’s employment trajectory likewise 
started with mundane work but then 
improved: 
My first job was in a food hall, I was 
working at the till… I was only 
entitled to work part-time as I was a 
student, so I was only working up to 
20 hours [per week]… [In the food 
hall] I realised that employers liked 
                                                 
 
15 Since 2002, asylum-seekers have no entitlement to 
work irrespective of how long they have been waiting for a 
decision on their application.  
to boss around employees and this 
made me set up my own business – 
I don’t want to order my employees 
around. 
The Ankara Agreement, briefly described 
above, presented Hulya with the opportunity 
to set up her own cleaning company, which 
she did with the financial support of her 
father. 
Hence in accessing work, we also see the 
relevance of policy nodes: Lale, an 
economic migrant from a former British 
colony, had few restrictions on her life after 
entering the UK; Baran had to wait several 
months before he was allowed to access 
work; and Hulya benefited from a special 
agreement, but one which channelled her 
into setting up her own small business. It is 
clear how, in complex and highly 
differentiated ways, a wide range of policies 
and rules are in place to permit, regulate, 
control and exclude movements of people 
from different countries into the UK and 
their subsequent ability to progress and 
adapt. Outside of the formal domain of 
policies and regulation there are other 
actors: family members, personal friends, 
agencies, smugglers and people traffickers, 
all supplying services and information some 
of which have a cost. Not without reason, 
therefore, have some researchers likened 
contemporary migration to a global 
business, one that can very easily lead to 
the exploitation of less well-informed 
migrants (Salt and Stein 1997).  
All of our migrant and key-informant 
interviews revealed their ambiguous 
feelings towards the UK. Baran sums up his 
overall experience: 
We live here as second-class 
citizens. Of course some migrants 
have financially good positions. But 
living standards cannot be 
measured by money alone… Many 
migrants only work to earn money. 
Their living standards are, of course, 
more comfortable than in Turkey. 
The country’s democratic rights, 
education and institutions are a 
thousand times better than in 
Turkey. But there is a question mark 
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in my mind about how much 
migrants are allowed to use them. 
This sense of only partially belonging to the 
wider host society was also repeatedly 
articulated by the key informants whose 
positionality gave them a wider perspective. 
Lack of recognition, on the part of the 
‘authorities’, of the specific problems facing 
the CTK target populations was a recurrent 
theme. A crucial issue was the generally 
poor level of English of the CTK immigrants, 
and the limited (and decreasing) provision 
of language support, both vital for 
accessing services such as healthcare: 
The language issue is the main one 
because, especially here in 
Hackney, language provision – it’s 
not sufficient, it’s not enough. 
There’s a long waiting list, and 
secondly, there are many issues, 
ongoing issues for years and years, 
for example health and mental 
health issues… There is no proper 
support – especially Turkish-
speaking support – for mentally-ill 
people (refugee spokesperson, 
Hackney). 
Language support implies two things: 
English lessons for migrants and 
interpreting services. English-language for 
migrants has recently taken centre-stage in 
political discussions about social exclusion 
and immigration as part of the Labour 
government’s community cohesion agenda. 
Many studies have in fact long highlighted 
how those who are in most need of access 
to public services are often the least able to 
do so (Alexander et al. 2004). This is 
certainly the case with the CTK populations; 
we noted earlier how elderly Turkish 
Cypriots often find themselves isolated from 
much-needed healthcare services. Key 
informants pointed out that there had been 
recent cuts in funding for English lessons 
provided to asylum-seekers. Formal 
interpreting services for migrants also 
remain in short supply (Alexander et al. 
2004). Subject to ad hoc and uncertain 
funding, the provision of interpreting 
services is quite variable within local 
authorities, schools, the health service and 
in the voluntary and private sectors. Instead 
the CTK communities and their respective 
organisations often rely on their own 
resources, such as members’ financial 
contributions. In an even more informal 
way, children often act as interpreters for 
their Turkish, Cypriot or Kurdish parents, 
which has the effect of altering gender and 
generational relationships within the family 
unit, sometimes, it is claimed, in a negative 
way: 
Parents cannot speak English or 
learn it easily. When the time 
comes, they use their children as 
interpreters, so the roles of the 
family change. Children can achieve 
a leading position, and fathers 
especially – because of traditional 
things, to close the gap – they use 
violence, especially on girls 
(refugees spokesperson, Hackney). 
Poor educational results of many CTK 
children, along with their involvement in 
juvenile crime and youth gang culture, also 
places strain on parental relationships 
(Enneli et al. 2005). Key informants saw 
these problems as not unique to their own 
migrant communities, but a more general 
reflection of the high level of social 
deprivation in the parts of London where 
the CTK populations are concentrated. In 
policy terms, the absence of youth centres, 
and hence of activities for young immigrant-
origin people to engage in, is seen as one 
reason behind the growth of Turkish and 
Kurdish gangs. These gangs are usually 
ethnically differentiated, although some 
mixing occurs too, according to our key 
informants. Identity is seen as a central 
issue: 
If they don’t belong to an identity, 
they tend to do a lot of criminal, 
anti-social behaviour. They form 
mafia street-gangs. Fighting and 
anti-social behaviour is becoming a 
problem (community centre 
representative). 
Whether the problem of youth crime lies in 
issues of identity, or lack thereof, is a moot 
point. What is less contentious is the strong 
correlation between poverty and alienation 
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because of the low levels of funding for 
after-school and community activities in 
socially-deprived neighbourhoods. Turkish 
and Kurdish community centres attempt to 
fill this void, and try to instil a sense of 
cultural identity in young people, while 
others are more geared towards education. 
Within the Kurdish community there are 
concerns that there is a lack of recognition 
on the part of the UK authorities that Kurds 
have a separate identity. On the one hand, 
as Kurds are often reluctant to register 
themselves due to a history of repression by 
the Turkish authorities, it is difficult for local 
policy-makers to assess the size of the 
Kurdish population in the UK and therefore 
to plan service provisions accordingly. On 
the other hand, there appears to be a lack 
of recognition within local authorities and 
public bodies in the UK of how 
inappropriate, not to mention upsetting, it is 
to subsume Kurds within the category 
‘Turkish-speaking community’. 
The school [our son now attends] 
said that, if we want, they can 
provide him with a Turkish-speaking 
assistant, but we refused (Kurdish 
family, quoted in Alexander et al. 
2004: 20) 
Similarly one of our key informants 
explained the potentially serious 
consequences of poor interpreting services: 
They are forced in a way to speak 
Turkish with their doctor through an 
interpreter, or speak Turkish with 
the consultant in a hospital before 
an operation. And sometimes they 
don’t know what ‘kidney’ means in 
Turkish. How could they express it? 
In one case a woman died, and the 
main accusation by the family was 
the interpretation. They said the 
interpreter couldn’t interpret 
properly. 
Certainly, a question mark hangs over 
whether adequate provisions are being 
made to allow Kurdish children to learn and 
practise their mother tongue in Britain. At 
present, the Kurdish language and identity 
are largely promoted through community 
organisations. Yet Alexander, Edwards and 
Temple’s (2004) survey of access to 
interpreting services echoed concerns that 
some Kurds are reluctant to use community 
centres which to them appear too overtly 
political. It has also been suggested by the 
same authors that the Kurds from Turkey 
are not a cohesive ‘community’ as such but 
that, rather, friends constitute the real 
‘content’ of the community, in the absence 
of established ethnic or institutional 
framings. In Baran’s case, it is of note that 
he travelled to the UK where he had no 
family or other ties, and today he shares his 
accommodation with a group of foreign 
friends. 
 
The future: settlement or return? 
None of the migrants we interviewed had 
any concrete intention of returning to their 
countries of origin. Key informants 
confirmed the more-or-less settled nature of 
the three CTK communities, with minimal 
return flows (e.g. of some retired Turkish 
Cypriots to North Cyprus). On the other 
hand, their feelings towards British society, 
as we heard from some of the quotes 
above, are still sometimes quite 
ambivalent. Baran and Hulya, in particular, 
expressed the view that there remains an 
underlying tension within ‘multicultural’ 
Britain, creating only a partial attachment to 
the UK as a place of belonging. Their 
feelings of being somewhat separate from 
the wider society – an ‘other’ – were most 
obvious when they spoke of racism, which 
they largely attributed to the media and 
government policy.  
Baran, however, gives the impression that 
he would return to Turkey if the political 
situation improved – something which in 
the short term seems unlikely. His legal 
status in the UK is still unresolved: he has 
been granted humanitarian protection, but 
not the refugee status that would give him 
permanent residency. The risk of 
deportation back to Turkey is an ever-
present concern for those without a legal 
status in the UK. 
Lale and Hulya, in contrast, identified more 
positive scenarios for staying in the UK. Lale 
felt more at home in London than in Cyprus, 
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a common reaction amongst long-resident 
and second-generation Turkish Cypriots 
(Robins and Aksoy 2001). On her most 
recent visit to Cyprus, she found her old 
home in Larnaca, in southern or ‘Greek’ 
Cyprus, as well as the capital Nicosia, much 
changed to the extent that she felt she no 
longer fitted in there. Her home in the old 
Turkish sector of Larnaca had been 
emptied of its Turkish Cypriot population 
who migrated north following the partition 
of Cyprus in 1974 (King and Ladbury 
1982). Greek Cypriots, refugees from 
northern Cyprus, were living in the houses 
vacated by the Turkish Cypriots, which Lale 
found very strange and disorientating. 
My son was very curious where I 
came from… So I took him… to 
Larnaca, where we went to my 
original house, which I found very 
difficult… Then we went to Nicosia, 
really  very strange, because it was 
like I was in a different country… the 
strangest thing was we stayed in 
this Greek hotel, they gave us a top-
floor room, which was very cheap… 
and my son opened the door onto 
the terrace but, shock, he called 
me, Mum come and have a look. 
And there over the rooftops against 
the mountains there were, you 
know, flashing out, ‘How proud one 
is to say one is Turkish’… and 
another place there are flags, 
Turkish flags, and minarets and 
voices coming from everywhere. I 
felt, oh God, a bit embarrassed 
because there is this huge amount 
of Greek people living here, and 
they have to have imposed [on 
them] this kind of thing day in, day 
out, no escape. It was kind of… as if 
I was in a European country and the 
contrast [with the Turkish sector] 
really shocked me, you know… And 
the Turkish side is degenerating 
fast, it’s really, really sad; I felt, do I 
really want to stay? (…) I couldn’t 
identify at all in Cyprus. Although I 
did feel, you know, on the Greek 
side, yes, this is my people… mind 
you a lot of Greek people in Greek 
Cyprus have emigrated back from 
London and you talk the same kind 
of language, you have the same 
ideas… their outlook to life is very 
similar (…) And I rented a Greek car, 
crossed the border, and as soon as I 
crossed the border I was told ‘What 
the hell are you doing renting a 
Greek car, couldn’t you have taken 
Turkish rented cars on this side?’… 
They were actually very interfering. 
There is still hostility towards 
Greeks.  Not all of them, there are 
progressive Turkish [Cypriot] people 
as well, you know, waiting for the 
unification of the island. 
Unfortunately, I didn’t have time to 
meet them. 
Hulya’s case, in the sense of commitment 
to remaining in Britain and security of being 
able to do so, is intermediate between 
Baran and Lale. She stressed how she 
wanted to raise her future children in 
Britain, yet she was worried whether her 
visa would be extended, allowing her to stay 
long-term. As she said: ‘I don’t regret 
coming to England. I am improving myself 
with useful courses so why should I leave all 
these and go back?’. 
Hulya and Baran illustrate a broader 
problem with many migrant communities in 
Britain and elsewhere: the nodal points 
along their path toward integration do not 
connect up with the legal status that would 
be required for a satisfactory long-term 
settlement or indeed a viable transnational 
lifestyle. This becomes clear when we 
consider how some asylum-seekers and 
their families, who appear to be settled and 
well-integrated in their new host countries, 
remain at constant risk of deportation 
because of their ‘unsettled’ legal status. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the chronology and 
characteristics of three groups of migrants 
who are conventionally but not always 
accurately associated with the label 
‘Turkish’, namely Turkish Cypriots, Turks 
from Turkey, and Kurds from Turkey. We 
have highlighted the stories of three 
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migrants, one from each group, who have 
followed different migration paths to Britain. 
Whether these paths are ‘typical’ or not, we 
cannot categorically judge, because of the 
smallness of the sample and the internal 
heterogeneity within each of the CTK 
communities. Interviews with key 
informants, plus the authors’ combined 
wider knowledge of these three groups and 
the parts of North London where they have 
predominantly settled, help to place the 
case-study narratives within a wider 
context, however. Our findings are 
illustrative rather than conclusive, they 
need corrobation and refinement through 
further research. This paper is therefore 
very much a pilot investigation. 
Despite the exploratory nature of our 
analysis, several implications are clear. 
Migrants follow quite diverse migratory 
trajectories. Whilst, on the one hand, this is 
a self-evident truism about virtually any 
migration flow; on the other it also reflects 
the growing diversity of migrant types, 
nationalities, mechanisms and motivations, 
especially in ‘super-diverse’ London. Gone, 
it seems, at least as far as the UK is 
concerned, are the days when mass 
recruitment schemes brought more-or-less 
homogenous migrant flows from abroad. 
Now, in this post-industrial, globalised and 
cosmopolitan setting of London, migrant 
flows have not decreased in scale but have 
become far more diverse. Family, personal 
and ethnic-community networks assume 
greater importance. This diversity and 
informality pose fundamental challenges for 
migration policy – both in terms of 
managing or controlling the flows, and as 
regards integration and social or community 
cohesion. 
We have shown that the concept of 
superdiversity functions as a good lead into 
the discussion of CTK groups because of 
their diverse make-up, which, as we have 
emphasised, is often hidden by official 
data. Hence, our paper demonstrates a 
concrete example of how, over time, the 
image of a superdiverse London has come 
into being, with the arrival of mainland 
Turks and then Kurds having the effect of 
adding successive layers to the make-up of 
a ‘Turkish’ or ‘Turkish-speaking’ population 
orignally made up of a Turkish-Cypriot base.  
Using the concept of nodal points derived 
from the wider MIGSYS project of which our 
small study was part, we have described 
the journeys of the migrants by breaking 
them into three distinct phases: before 
migrating, after, and return vs. settlement. 
It is clear, however, that these phases are 
interlinked in a more complex way than a 
simple linear or chronological account 
would lead us to believe. Above all, the 
migrants we interviewed still found the 
process of settling in the UK an unfinished 
journey. In Baran’s case, the reason for this 
was very much related to UK asylum policy 
and the fact that he remains without a 
secure and permanent residence status; his 
‘humanitarian protection’ status does not 
remove the risk that he could be deported 
back to Turkey at any time. There was also 
doubt expressed by Hulya as to whether her 
visa would be extended. As for Lale, whilst 
she does have a secure status and 
considers herself assimilated into Britain, 
the niggling sense of not fully belonging 
remains: at various points in her interview 
she referred to being marked out by her 
black hair and olive skin colour, her accent 
and the mistakes she still makes when 
speaking English. 
Regarding policy nodes, we identified two 
levels of migration-related policy which have 
impinged on the trajectories of CTK 
migrants. At the national and supra-
national level, we referred to Britain’s early 
immigration regime which gave privileged 
entry rights to (former) colonial subjects 
from Cyprus (and elsewhere); the EU-Turkey 
Ankara accord, which facilitated Turkish 
business migration to the UK; and the 
toughening rules on asylum since the late 
1990s, which have reduced asylum 
applicants from Turkey (who have been 
mainly Kurds) from nearly 4,000 in 2000 to 
around 750 in 2005. The effects of national 
policy are often most acutely felt at local 
level, where policy is implemented directly 
to migrants. The following key local policy 
issues can be identified as particularly 
relating to the CTK communities. 
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• The way the recent social cohesion policy 
agenda has coincided with cuts in funding 
for English-language support for asylum-
seekers, alongside the increased level of 
bureaucratic literacy required to access 
strategic funding. This is especially 
problematic and harmful for the most 
socially disadvantaged groups of 
immigrants and asylum-seekers, which 
include CTK migrants. 
• The relationship between restrictive 
asylum measures, the deskilling of migrants 
and their employment in low-wage jobs in 
the UK economy. Deskilling, combined with 
gendered and ethnicised barriers to certain 
kinds of employment, are characteristics of 
many migrations, but the asylum rules are 
particularly prohibitive and problematic, in 
our view. 
• The way that the ethno-national struggle 
between the Turkish state and the Kurds is 
played out at the local political and 
institutional level in the UK, e.g. in the 
competition for resources between Turkish 
and Kurdish groups, the use of the term 
‘Turkish-speaking’ to cover also Kurds, and 
the lobbying of Turkish authorities by 
certain British politicians. 
• The failure of local authorities to identify 
Kurds separately from Turks, and the 
reluctance of Kurdish people to register 
themselves as such, makes it difficult for 
policy-makers to assess their numbers and 
plan service provision accordingly. 
• A cluster of policy issues surrounding CTK 
youth: their general educational 
underachievement; their confused or ‘lost’ 
identities; the closure of youth centres and 
the consequent impact of this on the 
increase in anti-social behaviour, criminal 
activities and the formation of Turkish and 
Kurdish gangs. 
All of these are vital nodes, and there are 
several parallels to be noted, both with 
other immigrant groups in Britain, and 
elsewhere in Europe.16 The last on the list 
                                                 
16 For instance, the problematic identification and 
registration of Kurds from Turkey as a distinct group from 
other Turks is characteristic also of Germany (Wahlbeck 
1999). Explicit comparison between our findings for 
seems most urgent, for it will be crucial for 
the future of the Turkish-Cypriot-Kurdish 
elements of ‘super-diverse’ London. 
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